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Abstract: This contribution analyses whether, and to what extent, the law permits a
choice between finding liability in contract and in tort. The answer to this question is
important because the outcome of a case may differ depending on whether the claim for
damages is based on a breach of contract or on a violation of a tortious duty. The
contribution examines the approaches in several European jurisdictions. French law is
straightforward: finding liability in tort is not possible if the damage is caused by or
related to the (non-) performance of a contractual obligation. German, Dutch and
English law take the opposite point of view: finding liability in tort is not precluded if
the damage is caused by or related to the (non-) performance of a contractual obligation.
This contribution traces the historical development of these approaches and explains
their differences by looking at the underlying structure of these systems of private law.
It also shows that the resoluteness of both solutions has softened over time, as a result
of judicial and legislative interventions. To support this argument, recent developments
in case law and legislation are discussed.
Résumé: Cette contribution s’interroge sur la question de savoir si – et alors dans
quelle mesure – le droit offre un choix entre les actions en responsabilité contractuelle
et extracontractuelle. La réponse à cette question est importante car l’issue du litige
peut varier selon que la demande en dommages-intérêts est fondée sur la violation d’une
norme contractuelle ou extracontractuelle. La présente contribution examine cette
question au sein des différents systèmes juridiques. En droit français, la réponse est
univoque: la responsabilité extracontractuelle comme base de l’action en justice est
impossible si le dommage est causé par ou lié à l’(in)exécution d’un contrat. Les droits
allemand, néerlandais et anglais optent pour la solution inverse: utiliser la
responsabilité extracontractuelle est possible même si le dommage a été causé par ou
lié à l’(in)exécution d’un contrat. La présente contribution analyse le développement
historique de ces approches et explique leurs différences en recourant aux structures
sous-jacentes des systèmes de droit privé. Il se trouve que la détermination de chacune
de ces solutions s’est atténuée avec le temps, à la suite des interventions du juge et du
législateur. Pour soutenir cet argument, les développements récents dans la jurispru-
dence et la législation sont discutés.
Zusammenfassung: Dieser Beitrag analysiert ob und in welchem Ausmaß das
Zivilrecht eine Wahl zwischen vertraglicher und deliktischer Haftung eröffnet. Die
Antwort auf diese Frage ist von Gewicht, denn das Urteil in einem Rechtsstreit kann
unterschiedlich ausfallen, je nachdem, ob die Klage auf der Geltendmachung einer
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Vertragsverletzung oder einer außervertraglichen Pflichtverletzung beruht. Der Beitrag
analysiert die Ansätze in verschiedenen europäischen Rechtsordnungen. Das
französische Recht ist eindeutig: Eine deliktische Haftung ist ausgeschlossen, soweit
der Schaden im Zusammenhang mit der (Nicht-)Erfüllung einer vertraglichen Pflicht
steht. Das deutsche, niederländische und englische Recht nehmen den entgegengesetz-
ten Standpunkt ein: Die deliktische Haftung ist nicht ausgeschlossen, soweit der
Schaden im Zusammenhang mit der (Nicht-)Erfüllung einer vertraglichen Pflicht
steht. Der Beitrag greift die historischen Entwicklungen dieser Ansätze auf und
erklärt ihre Unterschiede, indem er die diesen Privatrechtssystemen zugrunde liegenden
Strukturen betrachtet. Er zeigt auch, dass die Strenge beider Lösungsansätze über die
Zeit hinweg, als Ergebnis richterlicher und gesetzgeberischer Einmischung, aufgeweicht
wurde. Als Unterstützung für dieses Argument werden jüngste Entwicklungen der
Rechtsprechung und Gesetzgebung diskutiert.
Key Words: Contract, Tort, Concurrence, Non-cumul, Anspruchskonkurrenz, Samenloop
1. Introduction
1. This contribution analyses whether, and to what extent, the law permits a
choice between finding liability in contract and in tort. The answer to this question
is important because the outcome of a case may differ depending on whether the
claim for damages is based on a breach of contract or on a violation of a tortious
duty. The contribution examines the approaches in several European jurisdictions,
analyses their historical development and explains their differences by looking at
the underlying structure of these systems of private law.
2. Comparative studies on this topic do exist, but they are either not written in
English,1 are somewhat outdated,2 or they provide a comprehensive assessment of
the law as it stands rather than an explanation of its development.3 It is the aim of
this contribution to add a current comparative account to these sources. This also
offers the opportunity to discuss recent developments in case law and legislation.
For present purposes, French, German and English law have been selected. These
1 K. BRIESKORN, Vertragshaftung und responsabilité contractuelle. Ein Vergleich zwischen deutschem und
französischem Recht mit Blick auf das Vertragsrecht in Europa (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2010); Y.-G.
VON AMSBERG, Anspruchskonkurrenz, Cumul und Samenloop. Eine rechtsvergleichende Untersuchung
der Konkurrenz von Ersatzansprüchen aus Vertrag und Delikt im belgischen, niederländischen und
deutschen Recht und ihrer Funktion in der Rechtsprechung (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang 1994); P.
SCHLECHTRIEM, Vertragsordnung und auβervertragliche Haftung. Eine rechtsvergleichende
Untersuchung zur Konkurrenz von Ansprüchen aus Vertrag und Delikt im französischen, amerika-
nischen und deutschen Recht (Frankfurt am Main: Alfred Metzner Verlag 1972).
2 T. WEIR, ‘Complex Liabilities’, in A. Tunc (eds), Encyclopedia of Comparative Law – Vol. XI Torts
– Part 2 (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1984), pp 3–39; M. VAN ROSSUM, ‘Concurrency of
Contractual and Delictual Liability in a European Perspective’, European Review of Private Law
1995, pp 539–559.
3 C. VON BAR & U. DROBNIG, The Interaction of Contract Law and Tort and Property Law in Europe
(München: Sellier European Law Publishers 2004), pp 26–315.
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are the most important private law systems in contemporary Europe, and they
represent both the civil and the common law traditions. Reference is also made
to Dutch law given that this system has been influenced by the French Code Civil
but has adopted a solution that is comparable to the approach under German law.
3. It is necessary to clarify three terminological issues from the outset. First of all,
this contribution only deals with the laws of contract and tort and not with the
remaining extra-contractual obligations.4 Secondly, this contribution focuses on
private parties and not on public bodies. The liability of public bodies is either a
matter of administrative law or governed by private law but influenced by admin-
istrative rules and principles.5 Thirdly, this contribution uses the common law term
‘tort’ instead of the civil equivalent ‘delict’.6
4. In order to fully understand the nature and scope of the problem, the contribution
first shows the areas of overlap (s. 2) and the distinctions (s. 3) between the laws of
contract and tort. The contribution then examines the approaches in several European
jurisdictions and traces their historical development. French law is straightforward:
finding liability in tort is not possible if the damage is caused by or related to the (non-)
performance of a contractual obligation (s. 4). German, Dutch and English law take the
opposite point of view: finding liability in tort is not precluded if the damage is caused
by or related to the (non-) performance of a contractual obligation (ss 5–6). The
analysis shows that these legal systems have developed these particular approaches
in the light of their own legal history and under the influence of the scope and
structure of their own laws of contract and tort. The analysis also shows that both
solutions are more nuanced than they seem at first sight. Moreover, a trend towards
convergence can be observed in all jurisdictions (s. 7).
2. The Overlap of the Laws of Contract and Tort
5. On the face of it, an act or omission may not only constitute a breach of
contract but may also violate a tortious duty. Incorrect performance of the contract
may, for instance, cause injuries to body or health or may inflict property damage.
Typically, these interests are also protected by the law of tort.7 Whether the facts of
a case actually fall within the laws of contract and tort depends on the scope of both
branches of the law in a particular legal order.
4 E.g. the law of unjustified enrichment, including undue payment (condictio indebiti), and the law
governing the benevolent intervention in another’s affairs (negotiorum gestio).
5 K. Oliphant (ed.), The Liability of Public Authorities in Comparative Perspective (Antwerpen:
Intersentia 2016).
6 R. ZIMMERMANN, The Law of Obligations. Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (Oxford:
OUP 1996), p 907.
7 This does not imply that the type of loss is decisive as regards the question whether liability in tort
can be established (in some jurisdictions it is not decisive, e.g. in France and the Netherlands).
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6. Liability for breach of contract can only be established when one of the parties
has failed to comply with the express or implied terms of the contract.8 It is therefore
necessary that a valid contract exists. This depends, first of all, on the definition of
contract. Some agreements do not fall within the law of contract in a particular
jurisdiction. It also depends on the rules that govern the formation9 and form of the
contract10 and on the presence of vitiating factors that may make the apparent
contract void ab initio (e.g. mistake or grounds of illegality) or with retroactive effect
(e.g. rescission for misrepresentation). Furthermore, the parties have to be bound by
the contract, which depends on the rules of agency and the rights of third parties.11 A
valid contract only creates rights and obligations for those parties during the period
that the contract is in force. As a consequence, liability for breach of contract does
not come into play if the facts took place before the parties concluded the contract or
after the contract has ended or has been terminated.12
7. In order for tortious liability to arise, the act or omission must have been unlawful,
which depends on the scope of the law of tort in a particular jurisdiction. Common law
jurisdictions rely on individual torts that have mainly been developed in case law. In
English law, for example, there are numerous torts and equitable wrongs. Some have a
broad field of application (negligence), but most are limited to particular situations
(e.g. assault, battery, trespass to goods, inducing breach of contract, conspiracy,
intimidation). Civil jurisdictions have codified their private law systems. In some of
these systems, the law of tort is based on broad, general provisions. In France, for
instance, every person who is at fault and thus causes harm to another person must
8 The subject can be approached even more extensively, by including those situations in which the
parties are in a special relationship ‘equivalent to contract’ (as is done by S. DEAKIN et al.,
Markesinis and Deakin’s Tort Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 7th edn 2013), pp 20–24).
However, the laws of contract and tort do not overlap here, so there is no choice available at all.
9 Offer and acceptance (cf. Art. 6:217 BW) may not be enough. English law requires consideration in
order for an agreement to constitute a contract. Until 2016, French law required a ‘cause’ (Art.
1108 CC). This requirement has been abolished in Art. 1128 CC, as a result of Ordonnance n°
2016-131 du 10 février 2016 portant réforme du droit des contrats, du régime général et de la
preuve des obligations, JUSC1522466R, available via www.legifrance.gouv.fr (hereinafter:
Ordonnance n° 2016-131).
10 In all legal systems, there are specific formalities for certain types of contract, such as the
requirement that contracts for the sale of land have to be in writing.
11 A contract may confer rights on third parties which are enforceable directly by the third parties
themselves. See e.g. the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999; Art. 6:253 BW.
12 H. BEALE et al., Ius Commune Casebooks for the Common Law of Europe – Cases, Materials and
Text on Contract Law (Oxford/Oregon: Hart Publishing 2010), pp 105–106. European legal
systems tend to establish precontractual liability on the basis of the law of tort or on the basis of
a special regime of precontractual liability (culpa in contrahendo, e.g. § 311, paras 2 and 3 BGB),
see J. CARTWRIGHT & M.W. HESSELINK, ‘Conclusions’, in J. Cartwright & M.W. Hesselink (eds),
Precontractual Liability in European Private Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008),
pp (449–488) at 457–460.
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compensate for any losses sustained.13 In Germany and the Netherlands, tortious
‘fault’ liability may only arise when certain interests have been harmed or when certain
norms have been violated. Liability may arise when a legally acknowledged right has
been infringed, when a statutory duty has been breached,14 or following a violation of
either public morals with the intention to inflict damages15 or, of a rule of unwritten
law pertaining to proper social conduct.16
8. Similar lines can be recognized when it comes to the activities or capacities to which
the law attributes a so-called ‘strict’ tortious liability. Liability may then be established
without proving ‘fault’ on the part of the defendant,17 although it may be possible for the
defendant to escape liability, for instance, by proving that he has exercised reasonable
care. French lawmaintains several strict liability regimes, including a general liability for
damage caused by a chose (an object or thing)18 and a general liability for damage caused
by a person that is under the tortfeasor’s supervision.19 Both liabilities were established
by theCour de Cassation on the basis of Article 1384, paragraph 1 CC and have recently
been codified by the legislature in Article 1242 CC. In other legal systems, strict liability
only exists on the basis of specific rules with a more limited scope.20
9. The law generally offers the aggrieved party several rights (or remedies).21 If the
necessary conditions are fulfilled, the law of contract entitles him to claim damages, to
demand specific performance, to request an injunction and to terminate the contract.22
The principal rights (or remedies) available to a victim of a tort are
damages to compensate for the harm suffered and an injunction to prevent future
harm.23 When it comes to the relationship between the laws of contract and tort, one
13 Formerly Art. 1382 and 1383 CC, currently Art. 1240 and 1241 CC.
14 § 823 BGB; Art. 6:162, para. 2 BW.
15 § 826 BGB.
16 Art. 6:162, para. 2 BW.
17 In English law, ‘fault’ assumes three forms: malice, intention (including recklessness), and negli-
gence (S. DEAKIN et al., Tort Law, p 27).
18 Cass. Civ. 16 June 1896, S. 1897. I. 17, note ESMEIN (Teffaine).
19 Cass. ass. plén. 29 March 1991, D. 1991. 324, comm. LARROUMET, JCP 1991. II. 21673 (Blieck).
20 English law knows several specific torts that do not require proof of malice, intention, recklessness or
negligence (e.g. breach of statutory duty, trespass to land, defamation, vicarious liability, liability for
animals). German law knows specific strict liability rules (§ 833 BGB and several acts outside the BGB).
The same goes for the Netherlands (cf. Art. 6:169-184 BW, on liability for persons and things).
21 Traditionally, English lawyers see rights through the lens of the remedies by which they are given
effect. For a comparison between the common law and the civil tradition on this point, see H.
DEDEK, ‘From Norms to Facts: The Realization of Rights in Common and Civil Private Law’, 56.
McGill Law Journal 2010, pp 1–37.
22 The range of rights (or remedies) also depends on the nature of the contract. Their order may differ
from one legal system to another.
23 W. VAN GERVEN et al., Ius Commune Casebooks for the Common Law of Europe – Cases, Materials
and Text on National, Supranational and International Tort Law (Oxford / Portland: Hart
Publishing 2000), pp 740–741 and 868–871. § 249, para. 1 BGB prescribes restitution in kind as
705
question has always been at the heart of the debate: does the law allow one contracting
party to claim damages in tort from the other contracting party?24 As the next section
shows, the answer to this question matters because the outcome of the case may not
always be the same depending on whether the claim is based on one branch of the law or
the other.
3. The Differences Between the Laws of Contract and Tort
10. The overlap between the laws of contract and tort does not give rise to
problems as long as application of the rules produces the same outcome.
However, the laws of contract and tort vary in certain ways, which may lead to
different results, depending on the basis of the claim for damages. On a funda-
mental level, this may be caused by the different aims of the laws of contract and
tort. Generally speaking, the law of tort protects persons and their property, while
the law of contract promotes their development.25 In practice, the most important
differences relate to the establishment and scope of liability, to questions of
limitation or prescription and to questions of jurisdiction.
11. The first category concerns the conditions that are required to establish
liability. For the outcome of the case, the following are determining factors: the
elements which, when taken together make a successful claim; the tests which have
to be applied to fulfil those conditions; who is under the obligation to furnish the
relevant facts; and who bears the burden of proof. These rules may differ. For
instance, a strict liability regime does not, typically, require the claimant to argue
(and if contested, prove) fault on the part of the defendant. It is up to the defendant
to argue (and if contested, prove) the absence of fault, provided that the law allows
such a defence.
12. Secondly, the scope of liability may differ. This question concerns the type and
extent of the losses that may be recovered under the respective heads of liability.26 The
laws of contract and tort may vary with regard to the type of loss that may be claimed27
the first and foremost remedy, Art. 6:103 BW prescribes restitution in money, but allows the victim
to claim, and the court to order, restitution in kind.
24 C. VON BAR & U. DROBNIG, The Interaction of Contract Law and Tort and Property Law in Europe,
p 189; T. WEIR, in Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, p 6.
25 T. WEIR, in Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, p 5.
26 Some legal systems deal with this question when establishing liability (e.g. English and French
law), while other legal systems deal with this question after liability has been established (e.g.
German and Dutch law). See W. VAN GERVEN et al., Tort Law, pp 395–427.
27 E.g. pure economic loss, consequential economic loss and non-economic loss. Dutch and French law are
not familiar with a separate category of pure economic loss. German law generally excludes pure
economic loss from the scope of the law of tort, while English law typically allows recovery of pure
economic loss under the ‘economic’ torts, but shows restraint when it comes to the tort of negligence. For
an overview of the rules and exceptions, see W.H. VAN BOOM, ‘Pure Economic Loss. A Comparative
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and with regard to the possibility to demand exemplary or punitive damages.28 The
scope of liability is also determined by the remoteness of the damage. To determine
whether or not the damage is too remote, most legal systems refer to factors such as the
underlying duty, the nature and foreseeability of the damage29 and the nature of the
defendant’s act.30 The underlying duty is also important for the assessment of a
defence of contributory negligence31 and for the applicability of contractual or statu-
tory rules that limit or reduce the scope of recoverable damages. Finally, the calcula-
tion of damages proceeds on different bases: damages for breach of contract aim to
bring the claimant in a position as if the contract had been performed (positive
interest), whereas damages for tort aim to bring the claimant in a position as if no
tort had been committed (negative interest).32
13. A third issue relates to the limitation of the action or the prescription of the
claim.33 Due to differences in the commencement and the duration of the applic-
able time limits, one claim may already be barred by limitation or prescription
while the other claim may still be enforceable. Even when a general regime has
been created for all claims for damages, specific rules may exist for certain
liabilities.34
14. Finally, the liability rules may lead to different competent courts. This issue
does not only present challenges if the facts of the case are linked to different
Perspective’, in W.H. Van Boom et al. (eds), Pure Economic Loss (Wien / New York: Springer 2004), pp
1–40.
28 Exemplary or punitive damages are generally only available in tort, in as much as they are available
at all. They are typically not available in contract, unless contracting parties include in their
contract a clause providing for the payment of an agreed sum for non-performance of a contractual
obligation. See generally C. VON BAR & U. DROBNIG, The Interaction of Contract Law and Tort and
Property Law in Europe, p 110.
29 E.g. Art. 1231, para. 3 CC (formerly Art. 1150 CC) limits recovery in contract to foreseeable
damage.
30 See e.g. Art. 6:98 BW; J. CARTWRIGHT, ‘Remoteness of Damage in Contract and Tort: A
Reconsideration’, 55. The Cambridge Law Journal 1996, pp 488–514.
31 In some cases, contributory negligence cannot reduce damages, e.g. when the claim is for strict
liability for accidents caused by motor vehicles (Art. 3, Loi n° 85-677 du 5 juillet 1985 tendant a
l’amelioration de la situation des victimes d’accidents de la circulation et a l’acceleration des
procedures d’indemnisation) or for the breach of a strict contractual duty (cf. A. BURROWS,
‘Comparing Compensatory Damages in Tort and Contract: Some Problematic Issues’, in S.
Degeling, et al. (eds), Torts in Commercial Law (Sydney: Thomas Reuters 2011), pp (367–390)
at 368.
32 See generally W. VAN GERVEN et al., Tort Law, p 33.
33 Unlike prescription, limitation does not extinguish the right, but only makes it impossible to
enforce it.
34 E.g. French, German and Dutch law provide one regime that governs all claims for damages (Art.
2224 CC; § 195 BGB; Art. 3:310 BW). At the same time, there are special time limits, e.g. for
certain contractual claims (e.g. Art. 114-1 Code des assurances; § 438 BGB; Art. 7:23, para. 2 BW).
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jurisdictions as challenges may also arise within the confines of one jurisdiction.
The legislature may have designated special courts to adjudicate on claims with a
certain value, such as county courts or sub-district courts, or on claims of a certain
type, such as labour courts or maritime law courts. The claimant may or may not
prefer to bring proceedings before a special court, for instance, because legal
representation is or is not mandatory. The nature of the claim may also determine
whether the claimant is permitted to take the matter to another court than the
court of the defendant’s domicile and whether legal aid is available.35
15. The differences outlined abovemay ormay not arise. As will become apparent, in
some respects, some legal systems have successfully converged their liability rules. Yet
it is safe to say that in all jurisdictions, the outcome of a case will not always be the same
depending on whether the claim is based on the breach of a contractual obligation or
on the violation of a tortious duty. For the aggrieved party, it may therefore be more
favourable to sue in either contract or tort. This raises the question whether, and to
what extent, the law permits such a choice. The following sections examine how this
question is answered in terms of French, German, Dutch and English law.
4. French Law
16. The relationship between the laws of contract and tort has generated con-
siderable interest in French literature. At the end of the 19th century, the debate
was triggered by the scholars Sainctelette and Grandmoulin. Sainctelette argued
that voluntary obligations, created by a contract, should be clearly distinguished
from obligations imposed by the law.36 By contrast, Grandmoulin argued that no
separate regime of contractual liability existed, as this liability was part of a unified
‘théorie de la responsabilité’.37
17. Eventually, most scholars adopted an intermediate position, according to
which contractual and tortious liabilities were part of the general law of obligations
however, should be treated differently.38 As Brun stated in 1931: ‘il n’y a pas deux
35 Joyce v. Sengupta [1992] EWCA Civ 9 provides an example, although the case concerned con-
current claims in tort. The plaintiff sued only on the basis of the tort of injurious falsehood and not
on the basis of defamation, because legal aid was not available for defamation.
36 C. SAINCTELETTE, De la responsabilité et de la garantie (Paris: Chevalier-Marescq 1884), p 15. The
same idea was developed by M. SAUZET, ‘De la responsabilité des patrons vis-à-vis des ouvriers dans
les accidents industriels’, Revue critique de législation et de jurisprudence 1883, pp 596–640.
37 J. GRANDMOULIN, De l’Unité de la responsabilité, ou Nature délictuelle de la responsabilité pour violation
des obligations contractuelles (Rennes: A. Le Roy 1892), p 88. The same idea was developed by A.F.
LEFEBVRE, ‘De la responsabilité, délictuelle, contractuelle’, Revue critique de législation et de jurispru-
dence 1886, pp (485–523) at 494: ‘Toute faute est delictuelle. La faute contractuelle n’existe pas.’
38 See for an overview E. JUEN, La remise en cause de la distinction entre la responsabilité contractuelle
et la responsabilité délictuelle (Paris: L.G.D.J. 2016), pp 12–17, and G. VINEY, Introduction à la
responsabilité (Paris: L.G.D.J., 3rd edn 2008), p 399.
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responsabilités, mais deux régimes de responsabilité’.39 By then, most writers
supported the idea that the parties to a contract should only be subject to the law
of contract in order to respect the freedom of contract and the intention of the
legislature. It should not be accepted that parties, having concluded a contract,
could ‘escape’ into the general regime of tort.40
18. This solution became known as the principle of non-cumul des responsabilités
contractuelle et délictuelle (hereinafter: non-cumul). The terminology is somewhat
misleading, because it suggests that the only purpose of the rule is to make sure
that the aggrieved party is not compensated twice. This is surely stating the
obvious. It is neither the intention of the aggrieved party, nor the meaning of the
rule. Rather, the rule means that there is no overlap whatsoever. If the harm occurs
in the context of a contractual relationship, the law of tort is not applicable.41
19. Three judgments are usually cited to show that the Cour de Cassation had
already accepted the principle of non-cumul in the year 1890,42 reiterated this in
the year 192243 and firmly established this by the year 1927.44 Nevertheless,
according to several authors, these judgments did not create a convincing prece-
dent at the time.45 After all, the Cour de Cassation only stated that the conditions
39 A. BRUN, Rapports et domaines des responsabilités contractuelle et délictuelle (Lyon: 1931), p 382.
40 J.S. BORGHETTI, ‘La responsabilité du fait des choses, un régime qui a fait son temps’, RTDCiv 2010,
pp (1–40) at 23–24, with further references.
41 O. MORÉTEAU, ‘French Tort Law in the Light of European Harmonization’, 6. Journal of Civil Law
Studies 2013, pp (760–801) at 765.
42 Cass. Req. 21 January 1890, D. 1891. 1. 380. PH. BRUN, Responsabilité civile extracontractuelle
(Paris: LexisNexis, 2nd edn 2009), p 68, refers to this judgment and states that the principle of
non-cumul ‘a été pose dès la fin du XIXe siècle par la jurisprudence’.
43 Cass. Civ. 22 January 1922, D. 1922. 1. 16; S. 1924. 1. 105, note DEMOGUE. W. VAN GERVEN et al.,
Tort Law, p 41 (fn. 93), identify this judgment as the ‘leading case’; S. WHITTAKER, ‘Privity of
Contract and the Law of Tort: the French Experience’, 15. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1995,
pp (327–370) at 334, refers to the same judgment and notes: ‘By the 1920s, the rule of non-cumul
had become accepted by the majority of both courts and writers’.
44 Cass. Civ. 6 April 1927, D. 1927. 1. 201, note H. MAZEAUD. G. BABERT, Le système de Planiol –
Bilan d’un moment doctrinal (Poitiers: Université de Poitiers 2002), p 268 refers to this judgment
and states: ‘C’est donc bien en 1927 que la Cour de Cassation change sa jurisprudence.’
45 G. VINEY, ‘Pour une interprétation modérée et raisonnée du refus d’option entre responsabilité
contractuelle et responsabilité délictuelle’, 39. McGill Law Journal 1994, pp (813–827) at 817;
G. BABERT, Le système de Planiol, pp 265–266; J.S. BORGHETTI, RTDCiv 2010, pp 14–29; S. ABID
MNIF, L’option entre la responsabilité contractuelle et la responsabilité délictuelle (Paris:
L’Harmattan 2014), pp 74–78; H. CAPITANT et al., Les grands arrêts de la jurisprudence civile
(Paris: Dalloz, 13th edn 2015), p 265, no 4. See already J. POPESCO-ALBOTA, Le droit d’option: le
problème des deux ordres de responsabilité civile, contractuelle et délictuelle (Paris: Rousseau 1933),
p 172; R. SAVATIER, Traité de la responsabilité civile en droit français civil, administratif, profes-
sionnel, procédural (Paris: L.G.D.J. 1951), no. 149; E.N. MARTINE, L’option entre la responsabilité
contractuelle et la responsabilité délictuelle (Paris: L.G.D.J. 1957), p 16 et seq.
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for contractual and tortious liability are not the same46 and that damages for the
violation of a contractual norm have to be awarded on the basis of the law of
contract.47 Recourse to the law of tort is not excluded as a matter of principle.48
20. Upon closer examination, it appears that the courts have developed the principle
of non-cumul much more gradually. In fact, French courts, including the Cour de
Cassation, continued to allow recourse to the law of tort in several proceedings between
contracting parties also after the judgments of 1890, 1922 and 1927.49 It lasted until
1945 before the Cour de Cassation clearly expressed that a contracting party might not
benefit from the exercise of a tort claim if he could also bring a contractual claim.50
Several authors therefore argue that the principle was only truly established by the
1950s.51 The Cour de Cassation has since reaffirmed this position several times,52 and
has also begun to refer to the principle of non-cumul in its judgments.53
46 Answering the question whether every fault, however simple, should lead to the obligation to make
good the damage, Cass. Civ. 22 January 1922, D. 1922. 1. 16; S. 1924. 1. 105, note DEMOGUE,
responds that this is not the basic rule under the regime of contractual liability: ‘c’est seulement en
matière de délit ou quasi-délit que toute faute quelconque oblige son auteur à réparer le dommage
provenant de son fait’. The same reasoning can be found in Cass. req. 21 January 1890, D. 1891. 1.
380 and in Cass. Civ. 6 April 1927, D. 1927. 1. 201.
47 Cass. Civ. 22 January 1922, D. 1922. 1. 16; S. 1924. 1. 105, note DEMOGUE, states that the rules
governing extra-contractual liability are not applicable to a claim based on a breach of contract.
Such a claim is governed by the law of contract: ‘les articles 1382 et suivants sont sans application
lorsqu’il s’agit d’une faute commise dans l’exécution d’une obligation résultant d’un contrat’. The
same reasoning can be found in Cass. Civ. 6 April 1927, D. 1927. 1. 201.
48 J.S. BORGHETTI, RTDCiv 2010, pp 16–17; S. ABID MNIF, L’option entre la responsabilité contractuelle
et la responsabilité délictuelle, pp 74–75.
49 In Cass. Req. 14 December 1926, D. 1927. 1. 105, note JOSSERAND, the Cour de Cassation held that the
conduct of the responsible persons working at a psychiatric clinic constituted ‘en même temps que
l’inexécution de leur obligation contractuelle surveillance, une faute délictuelle’ towards the patient
concerned. An overview of the case law can be found in J.S. Borghetti, RTDCiv 2010, pp 17–21, and in
S. ABID MNIF, L’option entre la responsabilité contractuelle et la responsabilité délictuelle, pp 76–77.
50 Cass. Civ. 6 March 1945, D. 1945. 1. 217.: ‘la victime d’un dommage [provenant de l’inexécution
d’un contrat ou de sa mauvaise exécution], qui peut exercer l’action contractuelle, ne saurait
préférer l’exercice de l’action délictuelle’.
51 G. VINEY, 39. McGill Law Journal 1994, p 817; E.N. MARTINE, L’option entre la responsabilité
contractuelle et la responsabilité délictuelle, p 16 et seq.; S. ABID MNIF, L’option entre la
responsabilité contractuelle et la responsabilité délictuelle, p 78. PH. BRUN, ‘De l’intemporalité du
principe de responsabilité du fait des choses’, RTDCiv 2010, pp (487–497) at 491, also admits that
the principle of non-cumul ‘ne s’est pas imposée d’emblée et définitivement sans quelques sou-
bresauts, quelques hésitations et peut-être même sans quelques mouvements contradictoires’.
52 PH. BRUN, Responsabilité civile extracontractuelle, p 68, referring e.g. to Cass. 1e Civ. 4 November 1992,
Bull. civ. I, no. 276: ‘le créancier d’une obligation contractuelle ne peut se prévaloir contre le débiteur
de cette obligation, quand bien même il y aurait intérêt, des règles de la responsabilité délictuelle’.
53 The Cour de Cassation refers to ‘la règle du non-cumul des responsabilités contractuelle et
délictuelle’ (Cass. 2e Civ. 3 March 1993, no. 91-17.677) and to ‘le principe de non-cumul des
responsabilités contractuelle et délictuelle’ (Cass. 1e Civ. 28 June 2012, no. 10-28492).
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21. Apart from the influence exerted by the literature, there are other reasons
that seem to have motivated the courts to finally embrace the principle of non-
cumul. One important reason was the significant expansion of the general strict
liability for damages caused by a chose (an object or thing) under Article 1384,
paragraph 1 CC. In the judgment Jand’heur (1930), the Cour de Cassation decided
that (1) the presumption of liability under Article 1384, paragraph 1 CC could only
be rebutted by proving that the damage had been caused by chance, by force
majeure or by an external cause that could not be imputed to the defendant, that
(2) in order to escape liability, it did not suffice that the defendant had not been
negligent or that the cause of the damage remained unknown, and (3) that in order
to establish this liability, it was not relevant whether the defendant wielded the
object, nor was it necessary to prove that the object was, by its nature, defective and
thus likely to cause damage.54
22. By its ruling in Jand’heur, the Cour de Cassation effectively created the
possibility to hold any gardien of any object liable for the damage caused by that
object, even if the defendant successfully proved that he was not at fault. Needless
to say that, without any restriction, an extra-contractual regime with such general-
ity would be able to intrude and possibly distort the rules governing the liability of
parties to a contract. A contracting party would have a claim each and every time
his property was damaged by an object that was controlled by the other contracting
party. Although scholars quarrel about the exact causal relationship, the expansion
of this strict liability regime has clearly been an important reason for the courts to
further strengthen the principle of non-cumul.55
23. This impression was confirmed by yet another significant turnaround in the
case law of the Cour de Cassation. In the judgment Mercier (1936), the Cour de
Cassation clarified that the relationship between medical practitioners and their
patients was contractual.56 The driving force behind this decision was likely to have
been the need to shield medical practitioners from liability under Article 1384,
paragraph 1 CC.57 Given the principle of non-cumul, this qualification brought
these relationships exclusively within the realms of the law of contract. According
54 Cass. ch. réun. 13 February 1930, D. 1930. 1. 57, S. 1930. 1. 121, note ESMEIN (Jand’heur).
55 J.S. BORGHETTI, RTDCiv 2010, pp 25–29, argues that this has been the main reason for the courts to
finally establish the principle of non-cumul. PH. BRUN, RTDCiv 2010, p 491, argues that the
principle was already established in 1890, but admits that ‘l’avènement du principe de
responsabilité du fait des choses ait pu conduire la jurisprudence à affermir sa position sur
l’interdiction de l’option’.
56 Cass. Civ. 20 May 1936, D. 1936. 1. 88, note E.P.; S. 1937. 1. 321, note BRETON (Mercier).
57 J.S. BORGHETTI, RTDCiv 2010, pp 26–28. Some patients also benefited from this outcome, because
the claim became subject to a more favourable regime of prescription. See J. BELLISSENT,
Contribution à l’analyse de la distinction des obligations de moyens et des obligations de résultat:
À propos de l’évolution des ordres de responsabilité civile (Paris: L.G.D.J. 2001), no. 956.
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to Whittaker, it clearly dawned on the courts that ‘by manipulating the boundaries
of contract, they can manipulate the boundaries of delict’.58
24. One may wonder, however, why the courts did not ‘manipulate’ those bound-
aries directly, by adjusting the interpretation of Article 1384, paragraph 1 CC to
take into account the special nature of the relationship between doctors and their
patients. The courts may have taken the view that this general provision was not
that easy to adjust, that the interpretation given in Jand’heur should not be revised
so soon or that the solution in Mercier was in fact a good compromise. A similar
question comes to mind concerning the solution of non-cumul itself. Instead of
excluding the application of the law of tort altogether, why did the courts not adjust
the tort claim to the rules and terms governing the contract? The courts may have
been influenced by the then prevailing doctrinal opinion,59 according to which, the
regimes of contract and tort were fundamentally distinct and could not be mixed.60
25. As dogmatically sound as the principle of non-cumul may be, it does treat
contracting parties differently from and possibly less favourably than parties that
are not in a contractual relationship. This implication has not only been criticized
by scholars61 but has also been mitigated to some extent by the courts and the
legislature. The courts have, for instance, used and expanded the concept of
obligations de sécurité, obligations owed by one contracting party to look after
the personal safety of the other contracting party. This concept was established
by the Cour de Cassation for the first time in 1911,62 on the basis of Article 1135
CC, currently Article 1194 CC. According to this provision, agreements impose
obligations on parties not merely in respect of that which they have expressly
agreed upon but also in respect of that which follows from ‘l’équité, l’usage ou la
loi’. This provision has given the courts the necessary leeway to protect contracting
parties while taking into account the nature of their relationship.63 Some contracts
create obligations de moyens, under which parties have to take reasonable care,
while other contracts are a source of obligations de résultat, where liability may only
be escaped by proving the defence of force majeure or faute de la victime.
58 S. WHITTAKER, 15. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1995, p 336.
59 According to S. ABID MNIF, L’option entre la responsabilité contractuelle et la responsabilité
délictuelle, p 79.
60 See e.g. E. BONNET, ‘Responsabilité délictuelle et contrat’, 61. Revue critique de législation et de
jurisprudence 1912, pp (418–437) at 437; A. BRUN, Rapports et domaines des responsabilités
contractuelle et délictuelle, no 351.
61 E.g. by P. ESMEIN, ‘La chute dans l’escalier’, JCP 1956.I.1321.
62 Cass. Civ. 21 November 1911, D. 1913. 1. 249, note SARRUT, S. 1912. 1. 73, note LYON-CAEN
(Compagnie générale transatlantique).
63 J.S. BORGHETTI, ‘L’avant-projet de réforme de la responsabilité civile. Vue d’ensemble de l’avant-
projet’, Recueil Dalloz 2016, pp 1386–1395, no. 34; G. VINEY, Introduction à la responsabilité,
p 652; S. WHITTAKER, 15. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1995, p 336.
712
26. The courts and the legislature have also introduced exceptions to the princi-
ple of non-cumul.64 In fact, the courts have applied the law of tort to contractual
relationships in cases involving fraudulent behaviour,65 criminal offences,66 trans-
port accidents67 and construction defects.68 Moreover, the legislature has intro-
duced general liability regimes that apply to all road traffic accidents69 and to all
defective products,70 irrespective of whether a contract exists between the parties
involved.
27. In recent years, the French legislature has begun reforming the law of
obligations. All claims for damages are now subject to a general rule on
prescription.71 The general fault liability has been codified in the Articles 1240–
1241 CC and the strict liability for persons and things has been codified in Article
1242 CC.72 A reform of the remaining parts of the law of obligations is currently on
the legislative agenda. In its proposals, the Minister of Justice suggests harmoniz-
ing several rules in respect of damages and causation.73 He also recommends
codifying the principle of non-cumul. The wording of the proposed Article 1233
CC makes clear that ‘in the case of non-performance of a contractual obligation,
neither the debtor nor the creditor may escape the application of provisions special
64 In some cases, the courts have even denied the existence of a contractual relationship, in order to
be able to apply the law of tort. This is, however, not really an exception to the rule, because the
laws of contract and tort do not overlap in those cases. See for some examples G. VINEY,
Introduction à la responsabilité, p 620; C. VON BAR & U. DROBNIG, The Interaction of Contract
Law and Tort and Property Law in Europe, pp 40–41.
65 G. VINEY, Introduction à la responsabilité, p 621, with references.
66 This exception originates from the case law of the criminal courts, who used to apply the law of tort
on a claim for compensation brought by the victim in the course of the criminal proceedings. The
exception is outdated since the legislature gave criminal courts the authority to apply ‘des règles de
droit civil’, including the law of contract. See G. VINEY, Introduction à la responsabilité, pp 621–
623, with references.
67 For some time, close relatives of the victim of a transport accident could not only claim in contract,
but also in tort. See G. VINEY, Introduction à la responsabilité, pp 623–624, with references.
68 This exception concerns the recovery of damages by the owner from the builder. See G. VINEY,
Introduction à la responsabilité, pp 624–626, with references.
69 Art. 1 Loi n° 85-677 du 5 juillet 1985 tendant à l’amélioration de la situation des victimes
d’accidents de la circulation et à l’accélération des procédures d’indemnisation.
70 Art. 1386-1 CC. This is a result of the implementation of Council Dir. 85/374/EEC of 25 July
1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member
States concerning liability for defective products, eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?
uri=CELEX:31985L0374:en:HTML.
71 Art. 2224 CC, modified by Loi n°2008-561 du 17 juin 2008.
72 As a result of Ordonnance n° 2016-131, supra n. 9.




to contractual liability in order to opt in favour of rules specific to extra-contractual
liability’.74
28. At the same time, the Minister intends to introduce an exception for bodily
injuries. The Catala committee have already suggested giving these victims the
choice between claiming in contract or in tort.75 The Terré committee went one
step further and proposed that bodily injuries should only ever be subject to the law
of tort.76 The latter suggestion was initially embraced by the Minister.77 This would
have led to the result that a person who had sustained bodily injuries could not
have claimed in contract at all, even when the contract had contained more
favourable terms.78 Responding to this criticism, the Minister now proposes to
add that the victim may not only rely on the law of tort, but also on ‘express
stipulations of a contract which are more favourable to him than the application of
the rules of extra-contractual liability’.79 If implemented, this rule would permit a
choice between finding liability in contract and in tort, thus introducing another
exception to the principle of non-cumul.
29. It is clear from the above that French law still struggles with the relationship
between the laws of contract and tort. Following the majority of scholars and
responding to the expanding scope of the general strict liability for things, the
courts have, gradually yet firmly, established the principle of non-cumul. At the
same time, the courts and the legislature have provided certain contracting parties
with additional protection, either by implying obligations de sécurité or by
74 Ibid., Art. 1233: ‘En cas d’inexécution d’une obligation contractuelle, ni le débiteur ni le créancier
ne peuvent se soustraire à l’application des dispositions propres à la responsabilité contractuelle
pour opter en faveur des règles spécifiques à la responsabilité extracontractuelle.’ Translated into
English by Simon Whittaker, in consultation with Jean-Sébastien Borghetti. This translation is
available through www.textes.justice.gouv.fr/art_pix/reform_bill_on_civil_liability_march_2017.
pdf.
75 Art. 1341, Avant-projet de réforme du droit des obligations et du droit de la prescription, available
through www.justice.gouv.fr/art_pix/RAPPORTCATALASEPTEMBRE2005.pdf. This solution had
been suggested before, e.g. by J. CARBONNIER, Droit civil – Tome 4 – Les Obligations (Paris: PUF,
18th edn 1994), no. 295.
76 Art. 3, see F. TERRÉ, Pour une réforme du droit de la responsabilité civile (Paris: Dalloz 2011).
77 Art. 1233, para. 2, L’avant-projet de réforme de la responsabilité civile, 29 April 2016, accessible
through www.textes.justice.gouv.fr/art_pix/avpjl-responsabilite-civile.pdf.
78 For that reason, the proposal was criticized, e.g. by R. DE GRAAFF & B. MORON-PUECH, ‘Le concours
des responsabilités contractuelle et délictuelle’, in: I. Alogna et al., ‘Regards comparatistes sur la
réforme de la responsabilité civile. Le rapprochement des responsabilités contractuelle et
délictuelle dans l’avant-projet de réforme, abordé sous l’angle du droit comparé’, 69. RIDC
2017, pp (5–44) at 16.
79 Art. 1233-1, para. 2, Projet de réforme du droit de la responsabilité civile, supra n. 73: ‘Toutefois, la
victime peut invoquer les stipulations expresses du contrat qui lui sont plus favorables que
l’application des règles de la responsabilité extracontractuelle.’ Translated into English by Simon
Whittaker, in consultation with Jean-Sébastien Borghetti, supra n. 74.
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introducing exceptions that reduce the scope of the principle of non-cumul. In spite
of these developments, the principle of non-cumul will probably be codified in the
near future. As a consequence, the point of departure under French law remains
fundamentally different to the position adopted in German, Dutch and English law.
In these jurisdictions, finding liability in tort is not precluded if the damage is
caused by or related to the (non-) performance of a contractual obligation, as the
following sections illustrate.
5. German and Dutch Law
30. The question whether, and to what extent, the law should permit a choice
between finding liability in contract and in tort has also been the subject of an
ongoing debate in German literature. The two main positions emerged during a
period of approximately thirty years after the introduction of the Bürgerliches
Gesetzbuch in 1900. Both sides pleaded for a clear distinction between contract
and tort but drew different conclusions. At one end of the spectrum, writers
defended the fundamental priority of the law of contract and the subsidiarity of
the law of tort. At the other end of the spectrum, writers defended the fundamental
independence of both regimes, which would imply that recourse to the law of tort
should remain possible.
31. According to the first theory (Gesetzeskonkurrenz), it is only the law of
contract which is tailored and therefore designed to deal with the relationship
between contracting parties. Even if a claim in tort seems, prima facie, possible,
such a claim should be repressed in favour of the law of contract. If this were not to
be the case, the balance of interests and the allocation of risks achieved under the
rules and terms governing the contract would be undermined. In effect, this would
render pointless large areas of the law of contract and would overrule the assess-
ments and intentions of the legislature.80
32. According to the second theory (Anspruchskonkurrenz), the interests of con-
tracting parties should also be protected by the law of tort. The law of contract
cannot be regarded as a special part of the law of tort, as the latter is not based on
one all-embracing, general clause and does not protect against purely economic
losses. A breach of contract does not therefore automatically constitute an unlawful
act or omission.81 Additionally, the law of tort cannot be regarded as subordinate
because it cannot be maintained that the law of contract, which deals with the
rights and duties of contracting parties, also settles the legal consequences of
80 Y.-G. VON AMSBERG, Anspruchskonkurrenz, Cumul und Samenloop, pp 15–17; P. SCHLECHTRIEM,
Vertragsordnung und auβervertragliche Haftung, p 33, with references.
81 R. DIETZ, Anspruchskonkurrenz bei Vertragsverletzung und Delikt (Bonn / Köln: Ludwig
Röhrscheid Verlag 1934), p 72 et seq.
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unlawful acts or omissions exhaustively. Since the two bodies of law are indepen-
dent, they should be treated independently, allowing the aggrieved party to claim
damages on any basis, as long as the necessary conditions (Tatbestände) are
present.82
33. Following the contribution by Dietz to the subject in 1934,83 the second
theory gradually gained the upper hand and came to enjoy general support. Its
acceptance by German courts dates back to 1916, when the Reichsgericht held that
the general legal duty not to injure another person exists towards all persons,
whether they have concluded a contract or not.84 Likewise, the Bundesgerichtshof
has repeatedly laid down that the aggrieved party may choose which legal ground
he wishes to base his claim for damages on and that every claim has to be decided
on its own merits and according to its own rules. The aggrieved party may also
revert to the law of tort when the contractual claim is time-barred or excluded.85
34. This position may be explained by a number of factors. Firstly, the ambit of the
German law of tort is narrower than in France. Not every breach of contract gives rise
to tortious liability. Contractual rights are not protected under § 823 BGB, pure
economic loss is generally not recoverable in tort and strict liability only exists on
the basis of specific rules more limited in scope.86 Secondly, the law of contract has
important advantages over the law of tort. The claimant does not have to argue (and if
contested, prove) fault in order to claim damages. It is up to the defendant to argue
(and if contested, prove) that the breach of contract cannot be imputed to him.87
Moreover, a contracting party is strictly liable for the conduct of those employed in
performing his obligation (§ 278 BGB) and this party cannot escape liability if reason-
able care was exercised by him when selecting and managing these employees, as is the
case under the law of tort (§ 831 BGB). In this context, giving the claimant the choice
to proceed on either basis will not have major consequences.88
35. This raises the question why the parties nonetheless tried to claim in tort, and
why the courts allowed such claims. For a long time, compensation for non-economic
loss (Schmerzensgeld) could only be awarded in tort, for example, for injuries to body
or health and in case of a deprivation of liberty,89 and not in contract.90 Moreover, the
82 Y.-G. VON AMSBERG, Anspruchskonkurrenz, Cumul und Samenloop, pp 17–18; P. SCHLECHTRIEM,
Vertragsordnung und auβervertragliche Haftung, p 33, with references.
83 R. DIETZ, Anspruchskonkurrenz bei Vertragsverletzung und Delikt, pp 93 et seq., 99 and 101.
84 Reichsgericht 13 October 1916, RGZ, 88, 433.
85 BGH 24 November 1976, BGHZ 67, 359; BGH 4 March 1971, BGHZ 55, 392. See recently BGH
11 February 2004, VIII ZR 386/02.
86 C.C. VAN DAM, European Tort Law (Oxford: OUP, 2nd edn 2013), p 90.
87 Currently § 280, para. 1 BGB, formerly § 282 BGB.
88 Cf. R. ZIMMERMANN, The Law of Obligations, pp 905–906.
89 Formerly § 847 BGB.
90 Formerly § 253 BGB.
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prescription periods in contract were sometimes much shorter. For instance, the time
limits for claims concerning the non-conformity of goods were very short: six months
or one year after delivery or transfer of the property.91 Since the Schuldrechtsreform of
2002, the rules on damages have been integrated into the general part of the law of
obligations (§ 249 et seq. BGB). Compensation for non-economic loss can also be
awarded in contract, for injuries to body or health, or for violations of the right to
freedom or of the right to sexual self-determination (§ 253 BGB). Moreover, the
legislature adopted one regime on prescription (§ 195 et seq. BGB), although specific
rules still exist for certain types of claim.92
36. While the solution of Anspruchskonkurrenz may have been helpful at the
time, it does also have its drawbacks. This solution is as straightforward as the
non-cumul principle. One of the regimes is excluded, not as a matter of princi-
ple, but rather as a result of the claimant’s choice. Without restrictions, this
may frustrate the purpose of contractual rules. It is therefore widely accepted
that the freedom of the claimant to pursue any claim he wishes may be limited if
the objective of one of the rules would otherwise be undermined. In fact, the
courts have already been applying standards for contractual liability93 and
shorter contractual prescription periods94 on concurrent tort claims for a long
time. The Bundesgerichtshof has repeatedly stated that while the conditions,
content and enforcement of every claim require to be assessed independently,
an exception can be made when it is clear that a certain provision regulates a
certain situation exhaustively, which may exclude or limit the possibility of
claiming on another legal basis.95 Although it is the exception and not the
91 Formerly § 477 BGB.
92 E.g. the special time periods applicable to claims relating to non-conformity of the goods (§ 438
BGB; § 634a BGB), to travel contracts (§ 651g, para. 2 BGB), to rental agreements (§ 548 BGB), to
commercial transport (§ 439 HGB).
93 E.g. the rule that the donor (Schenker, § 521 BGB), the lender (Verleiher, § 599 BGB) and the
board (Geschäftsführung, § 680 BGB) can only be held liable in the event of wilful conduct
(Vorsatz) or gross negligence (grobe Fahrlässigkeit) also applies to a tort claim against the donor
(BGH 20 November 1984, BGHZ 93, 23), the lender (BGH 23 March 1966, BGHZ 46, 140) and
the board (BGH 30 November 1972, NJW 1972, 475). And the rule that the depository
(Verwahrer, § 690 BGB) and the shareholder (Gesellschafter, § 708 BGB) can only be held liable
if they did not exercise the care they can be expected to exercise when managing their own affairs,
also applies to a tort claim against the depository (BGH 23 March 1966, NJW 1967, 42) and the
shareholder (BGH 20 December 1966, BGHZ 46, 313).
94 The prescription period for claims by the landlord (§ 548, formerly § 558 BGB) also applies to a
tort claim (BGH 31 January 1967, BGHZ 47, 53; BGH 24 May 1976, BGHZ 66, 315; BGH 8
January 1986, NJW 1986, 1608). The prescription period for claims by the lender (§ 606 BGB) also
applies to a tort claim (BGH 31 January 1967, BGHZ 47, 53).
95 This general rule of interpretation is emphasized again in BGH 22 July 2014, KZR 27/13, at 53,
with references to earlier case law.
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rule,96 it is clear that contractual liability rules may thus influence the sub-
stance of the tort claim.97
37. This has been an argument for some writers to assume that the claimant does
not have two separate claims (Anspruchskonkurrenz) but a single claim, based on
two separate norms (Anspruchsnormenkonkurrenz).98 This theory shifts the pro-
blem, but does not solve it. It is uncontroversial as long as the application of the
relevant norms would lead to the same legal outcome. Yet the theory lacks clarity,
even amongst its proponents, as soon as the differences become apparent and the
existence and content of the particular claim require to be determined.99 The
majority of the writers therefore continues to adhere to the theory of
Anspruchskonkurrenz however recognizes that the possibility to proceed in contract
or in tort may be limited.100
38. It is interesting to make a brief comparison between this position and the
approach followed in the Netherlands. Dutch writers have essentially put forward
the same arguments as their French and German colleagues although, the structure
of the law is not entirely comparable.101 As in Germany, the claimant does not have
to argue (and if contested, prove) fault in order to claim damages. It is up to the
defendant to argue (and if contested, prove) that the breach of contract cannot be
imputed to him (Art. 6:74 BW). While strict tortious liabilities only exist on the
basis of specific rules with a more limited scope than in France (Art. 6:169-184
BW), the scope of the regime of fault based liability in tort appears to be more
extensive than in Germany. The formulation of the duty of care is quite general –
one has to comply with ‘rules of unwritten law pertaining to proper social
96 E.g. the standards for the contractual liability of the Gesellschafter (§ 708 BGB) are not applicable
when the extra-contractual claim concerns a road accident (BGH 20 December 1966, BGHZ 46,
313).
97 This theory is known as einwirkende Anspruchskonkurrenz, see Y.-G. VON AMSBERG,
Anspruchskonkurrenz, Cumul und Samenloop, pp 19–21.
98 A. GEORGIADES, Die Anspruchskonkurrenz im Zivilrecht und Zivilprozeßrecht (München: C.H. Beck
1968), p 167 et seq.
99 Cf. D. MEDICUS, Gesetzliche Schuldverhältnisse (München: C.H. Beck, 5th edn 2007), p 7; Y.-G. VON
AMSBERG, Anspruchskonkurrenz, Cumul und Samenloop, p 21.
100 For an overview, see Y.-G. VON AMSBERG, Anspruchskonkurrenz, Cumul und Samenloop, pp 19–21.
101 In favour of exclusive application of the law of contract e.g. C.A. BOUKEMA, Civielrechtelijke
samenloop (Zwolle: W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink 1966), p 121 et seq.; L.D. PELS RIJCKEN, ‘Samenloop
van contractuele en buitencontractuele aansprakelijkheid naar Nederlands recht’, Tijdschrift voor
Privaatrecht 1980, pp (1101–1138) at 1125. Against exclusive application e.g. W. SNIJDERS,
‘Samenloop van wetsbepalingen in het Nieuw B.W.’, in Speculum Langemeijer (Zwolle: W.E.J.
Tjeenk Willink 1973), pp 453–471; J.H. NIEUWENHUIS, Anders en eender (Deventer: Kluwer 1982);
C.J.H. BRUNNER, Beginselen van samenloop (Arnhem: Gouda Quint 1984), p 66; F.B. BAKELS,
‘Aspecten van samenloop (I)’, 140. WPNR 2009/6796, no. 15.
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conduct’102 – and, in addition, there is no separate category of pure economic loss
and hence no exclusion of such losses from the scope of the law of tort.103
39. In accordance with the former Dutch Civil Code, which was heavily influenced by
the French Code Civil, the Hoge Raad had already made clear that an act or omission
may constitute both a failure in the performance of an obligation and a ground for
tortious liability provided the liability in tort exists ‘independently of the violation of a
contractual obligation’.104 Whether that was the case, had to be determined by looking
at the purpose of the violated norm, the nature of the conduct and the additional
circumstances of the case.105 A mere breach of contract was not enough.106 If a
concurrent tortious liability existed, the claimant might choose to proceed on that
basis. Evading the shorter prescription periods under the law of contract was one of
the reasons for trying to do so. The drafters of the newDutch Civil Code were well aware
of such problems. They decided to harmonize certain rules governing the different
liabilities, thereby reducing the tensions between them.107 Since 1992, the Dutch
Civil Code has contained a general regime for damages (Art. 6:95 et. seq. BW) and a
general regime for the prescription of claims (Art. 3:310 BW).
40. Differences continue to exist however. Giving the claimant an unconditional
freedom to claim in tort may then frustrate the purpose of contractual rules. As in
Germany, an exception is therefore made when this is prescribed by, or inevitably
follows on from, statutory law.108 The courts have, for instance, applied standards
for contractual liability109 and shorter contractual prescription periods110 on
102 This rule has been laid down by the Hoge Raad in HR 31 January 1919, NJ 1919/161, note W.L.P.
A. MOLENGRAAFF (Lindebaum/Cohen) and has been codified by the legislature in Art. 6:162, para. 2
BW.
103 Art. 6:95 BW.
104 HR 9 December 1955, NJ 1956/157, note L.E.H. RUTTEN (Bogaard/Vesta): ‘onafhankelijk van de
schending van een contractuele verplichting’. The rule was already laid down in HR 6 May 1892, W
6183 (Korf/Fhijnbeen); HR 26 March 1920, NJ 1920/476 (Curiel/Suriname); HR 11 June 1926, NJ
1926/1049, note P. SCHOLTEN (Canter Cremers/Otten). It was reiterated in HR 6 April 1990, ECLI:
NL:HR:1990:AD4737, NJ 1991/689, note C.J.H. BRUNNER (Van Gend & Loos/Vitesse); HR 19
February 1993, ECLI:NL:HR:1993:ZC0870, NJ 1994/290, note C.J.H. BRUNNER (Gem. Groningen/
Zuidema); HR 6 December 1996, ECLI:NL:HR:1996:ZC2219, NJ 1997/398 (Fortes/Smits).
105 Cf. HR 3 December 1999, ECLI:NL:HR:1999:AA3818, NJ 2000/235, note P.A. STEIN (Pratt &
Whitney/Franssen), at 3.5.
106 HR 23 May 1856, W 1852; HR 13 June 1913, NJ 1913/787 (Kuyk/Kinker).
107 As is evidenced by the contribution written by W. SNIJDERS, in Speculum Langemeijer, pp 453–471,
who was closely involved in the final drafting process of the new Dutch Civil Code.
108 As repeated in HR 15 June 2007, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:BA1414, NJ 2007/621, note K.F. HAAK
(Fernhout/Essent), at 4.2.
109 E.g. HR 2 March 2007, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:AZ3535, NJ 2007/240, note J.M.M. MAEIJER (Holding
Nutsbedrijf Westland), at 3.4.4.
110 HR 21 April 2006, ECLI:NL:HR:2006:AW2582, NJ 2006/272 (Inno Holding/Gemeente Sluis); HR
29 June 2007, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:AZ7617, NJ 2008/606, note JAC. HIJMA (Pouw/Visser).
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concurrent tort claims. Limitations may also follow from the express terms of the
contract or from its nature and purpose.111 Moreover, case law shows that the level
of the general duty of care may be influenced by the contractual obligations of the
parties.112
41. As in Germany, this has been argument for some writers to assume that the
claimant only has one ‘mixed’ claim (gemengd vorderingsrecht), based on two
separate norms.113 This theory has come up against comparable objections.
Given that the outcome of a dispute also depends on the arguments between the
parties and on the scope of the duty of the courts to apply the law ex officio,114 it is
argued that every claim has to be assessed on its own merits115 but that the
existence and content of the tort claim may be influenced by contractual rules.116
6. English Law
42. English law is exceptional because it is not built on the foundations of
Roman law.117 The law has never been codified, and has mainly been
developed by individual precedents laid down by decisions from courts with
different and sometimes overlapping jurisdictions.118 Legal education has not
traditionally been the domain of universities but of legal practitioners. It has
been ‘primarily practical and empirical, more the development of a professional
skill than a scholarly science’.119 This may explain why English lawyers have not
written about the subject of concurrent liabilities with the conceptual flavour of
111 HR 27 April 2001, ECLI:NL:HR:2001:AB1335, NJ 2002/54, note C.J.H. BRUNNER (Donkers/
Scholten); HR 25 October 2002, ECLI:NL:HR:2002:AE7010, NJ 2004/556, note Jac. HIJMA
(Bunink/Manege Nieuw Amstelland).
112 HR 15 May 1981, ECLI:NL:HR:1981:AG4187, NJ 1982/237, note B. WACHTER (Temi IV/Jan
Heymans), at 3; HR 27 February 1987, ECLI:NL:HR:1987:AG5547, NJ 1987/584 (Van der
Peijl/Erasmus College), at 3.4; HR 6 April 1990, ECLI:NL:HR:1990:AD4737, NJ 1991/689,
note C.J.H. BRUNNER (Van Gend & Loos/Vitesse), at 3.2; HR 19 October 2007, ECLI:NL:
HR:1990:AD4737, NJ 2007/565 (Vodafone/ETC), at 3.7.
113 W. SNIJDERS, in Speculum Langemeijer, pp 459–463; J.H. NIEUWENHUIS, Anders en eender, pp 18–22.
The Hoge Raad seems to adopt this position in HR 15 June 2007, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:BA1414, NJ
2007/621, note K.F. HAAK (Fernhout/Essent), at 4.2.
114 A.G. CASTERMANS & H.B. KRANS, ‘Samenloop en de toegang tot de rechter’, in A.G. Castermans et al.
(eds), Ex libris Hans Nieuwenhuis (Deventer: Kluwer 2009), pp (155–170) at 158–159.
115 F.B. BAKELS, ‘Aspecten van samenloop (II)’, WPNR 2009/6797, no. 22; J.H. NIEUWENHUIS, ‘They
Still Rule Us from Their Graves’, WPNR 2007/6693, pp 1–6; L.D. PELS RIJCKEN, Tijdschrift voor
Privaatrecht 1980, p 1102.
116 A.G. CASTERMANS, ‘Partijautonomie tussen contract en onrechtmatige daad’, Ars Aequi 2012,
pp 859–868.
117 Contrary to the civilian tradition, see R. ZIMMERMANN, The Law of Obligations, pp 1–33.
118 K. ZWEIGERT & H. KÖTZ, Introduction to Comparative Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2nd edn
1992), p 187 et seq.
119 Ibid., p 198 et seq.
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French lawyers or with the doctrinal rigour of German lawyers.120 Yet the
subject has most definitely been familiar to English lawyers. It was not unusual
that a plaintiff could choose between several forms of action nor was it
uncommon that one and the same matter could be brought either before a
common law court or before a court of equity, leading to different possible
outcomes.121
43. However, the subject was not defined in terms of contract and tort until
the mid-19th century. In 1873, there was significant reform of the courts
structure and of the law of procedure. From the entry into force of the
Judicature Act in 1875, all divisions of the High Court and of the Court of
Appeal became competent to apply all the rules and principles of English
law.122 The forms of action were abolished, so the claimant was no longer
obliged to choose at the very start of the litigation process which of the
different forms of action he was going to base his claim on.123 At the same
time, success in litigation still largely depended on the question of whether
any cause of action was raised by the particular facts of the case. This question
remained as important as ever before, as Maitland noticed:
The forms of action we have buried, but they still rule us from their graves.124
The reform of the law of procedure made it necessary to systemize the liabilities
that existed under the former forms of action. This task was undertaken by several
120 T. WEIR, in Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, p 36 noted that there was ‘almost no writing on the
topic in England’, referring only to P.H. WINFIELD, The Province of the Law of Tort (Cambridge:
CUP 1931); A.G. GUEST, ‘Tort or Contract?’, 3. Malaya Law Review 1961, pp 191–222; W.D.C.
POULTON, ‘Tort or Contract’, 82. Law Quarterly Review 1966, pp 346–370.
121 Cases of misrepresentation, for example, could be brought before common law courts and before
courts of equity. At common law, the defendant had to know of the untruth of the statement, or be
reckless as to its truth. Later decisions in equity made clear that liability for misrepresentation
could also be established for ‘constructive fraud’ or ‘innocent mistake’. Derry v. Peek [1889] 14
App Cas 337 (HL) clarified that both equity and common law required fraud to establish liability. In
turn, Derry v. Peek was confined, first in Nocton v. Lord Ashburton [1914] AC 932 (HL), and then
in Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v. Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465 (HL). About this development: J.
EDELMAN, ‘Nocton v Lord Ashburton’, in C. Mitchell & P. Mitchell (eds), Landmark Cases in Equity
(Oxford: Hart Publishing 2014), pp (473–498) at 479–484.
122 K. ZWEIGERT & H. KÖTZ, Introduction to Comparative Law, pp 205–206.
123 F.W. MAITLAND, Equity, also The Forms of Action at Common Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2nd edn
1910), p 295 et seq. A heavy blow was struck already in 1852, when the Common Law Procedure
Act 1852 provided in s. 3 that it should not be necessary to mention any form or cause of action in
any writ of summons.
124 Ibid., p 296; cf. F. POLLOCK, The Law of Torts. A Treatise on the Principles of Obligations Arising
from Civil Wrongs in the Common Law (Philadelphia: The Blackstone Publishing Company, 1st
edn 1887), p 336.
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writers, who published a series of influential textbooks in and around the 1870s.125
Without a fundamental reconsideration of the general structure of the law of
obligations, they assigned the existing liabilities to two legal categories and empha-
sized the distinction between them: liabilities were either consensual (contract) or
non-consensual (tort).126 This may have encouraged English lawyers to regard
contract and tort as mutually exclusive.127 Nevertheless, the categories did show
a certain overlap from the outset. As Pollock observed soon after the abolition of
the forms of action, some liabilities in contract ‘are not founded on the breach of
any agreement’, while some torts ‘are not in any natural sense independent of
contract’.128
44. For a long time, however, the overlap was rather limited. The scope of
the law of contract was, and still is, restricted by the doctrines of consideration
and privity. Under the doctrine of consideration, a promise is not contractually
binding if the other party has not done, or promised to do, something in
return for this promise. Under the doctrine of privity, a contract cannot confer
rights or impose obligations on any person except the parties to it.129 More
important in this context is that the scope of the law of tort was restricted too,
due to the relatively late emergence of the general duty of care in respect of
negligence.
45. The foundation of the tort of negligence was laid down in Donoghue v.
Stevenson. The House of Lords decided that a manufacturer owed a duty of care
in negligence irrespective of the question whether the injured person was a party to
the incidental contract of sale.130 Donoghue v. Stevenson was not a unanimous
decision nor was the reasoning clear and unambiguous. Today, however, it is
regarded as the starting point of the modern law of negligence as it was the first
time that the House of Lords recognized a general rule of liability for harm caused
by negligence. This general duty of care also applies when the parties are in a
contractual relationship. Not every breach of contract will, however, lead to a
125 P. ATIYAH, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1979),
pp 681–693.
126 T. WEIR, in Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, p 35.
127 According to A.G. GUEST, 3. Malaya Law Review 1961, p 191; cf. B. MARKESINIS, ‘An Expanding
Tort Law – The Price of a Rigid Contract Law’, 103. Law Quarterly Review 1987, pp (354–397) at
384.
128 F. POLLOCK, The Law of Torts, p 337. Cf. T. WEIR, in Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, p 35.
129 Although the doctrine of privity still stands up to scrutiny, the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties)
Act 1999 does determine that a contract may confer rights on third parties which are enforceable
directly by the third parties themselves.
130 Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] AC 562 (HL). There are older cases that foreshadowed the devel-
opment of the tort of negligence, see P. ATIYAH, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, pp 501–
505, with references.
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liability in tort.131 A concurrent liability in tort will only arise in the event that the
defendant’s behaviour would also have breached a tortious duty if there had not
been a contract between the parties. In other words: the defendant must have
violated an obligation to take reasonable care, independent of any obligation
under the contract.132
46. The question whether the law allows the aggrieved party to bring a claim in tort
used to arise primarily when negligent conduct of one contracting party caused physical
damage to the body, health or property of another contracting party. The courts accepted
that finding liability in tort was then possible.133 Pure economic loss was a different
matter. InHedley Byrne & Co Ltd v.Heller & Partners Ltd, the House of Lords accepted
for the first time that a person (in that case: a bank) could be held liable in negligence in
respect of pure economic loss resulting from reliance on amisstatement (in that case: an
inaccurate credit reference).134 This raised the question whether parties to a contract
could also be held liable in negligence in respect of pure economic loss. The courts both
allowed and rejected concurrent liabilities in this field.135
47. This question was authoritatively addressed by the House of Lords inHenderson v.
Merrett Syndicates. The case concerned a collection of claims brought by the members
(known as ‘names’) of the insurer, Lloyd’s, against the managing agents who had acted
on their behalf. The managing agents were either in a direct contractual relationship
with the names or were indirectly linked with them through agents. The names alleged
that in both situations the managing agents had assumed a direct responsibility to the
names. The names that entered into a contract with the agents wanted to establish a
concurrent duty of care in tort, in order to benefit from the more advantageous position
on the accrual of the cause of action in tort.136
48. In his leading speech,137 Lord Goff clearly showed his concern about the
‘adventitious effects’ of the existence of different rules in contract and tort as
131 F. POLLOCK, The Law of Torts, p 339 already noted that a mere non-performance of a promise
cannot be treated as a substantive tort. Robinson v. PE Jones (Contractors) Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 9
also makes clear that the mere existence of a contractual relationship is not enough to justify an
assumption of responsibility and concomitant reliance.
132 T. WEIR, in Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, p 36; A. BURROWS, Understanding the Law of
Obligations: Essays on Contract, Tort and Restitution (Oxford: Hart Publishing 1998), pp 25–26.
133 A. BURROWS, Understanding the Law of Obligations, pp 25–26, with references.
134 Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v. Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465 (HL).
135 The cases are mentioned by A. BURROWS, Understanding the Law of Obligations, p 26, fn. 25; and
summarized by Lord Goff in Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd (No. 1) [1995] 2 AC 145 (HL) at
184–194, with special attention for the statement by Lord Scarman in Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd
v. Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd [1986] UKPC 5 (PC).
136 Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd (No. 1) [1995] 2 AC 145 (HL), per Lord Goff, p 174.
137 All Lords agreed with the speech of Lord Goff. Lord Browne-Wilkinson delivered a short concur-
ring speech.
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regards limitation and remoteness of damage. He indicated that reform of these
incidental rules would be most welcome but readily admitted that ‘this is perhaps
crying for the moon’.138 After a careful assessment of the most important
authorities,139 including cases from other civil and common law countries,140
Lord Goff reached the following conclusion:
My own belief is that, in the present context, the common law is not antipathetic
to concurrent liability, and that there is no sound basis for a rule which auto-
matically restricts the claimant to either a tortious or a contractual remedy. The
result may be untidy: but, given that the tortious duty is imposed by the general
law, and the contractual duty is attributable to the will of the parties, I do not
find it objectionable that the claimant may be entitled to take advantage of the
remedy which is most advantageous to him, subject only to ascertaining whether
the tortious duty is so inconsistent with the applicable contract that, in accor-
dance with ordinary principle, the parties must be taken to have agreed that the
tortious remedy is to be limited or excluded.141
The House of Lords thus allowed finding liability in negligence in respect of pure
economic loss, also where the parties were in a contractual relationship. Unless ‘his
contract precludes him from doing so’, the claimant, ‘who has available to him
concurrent remedies in contract and tort, may choose that remedy which appears to
him to be the most advantageous’.142
49. The fact that tortious liability may arise if the damage is caused by or related
to the (non-) performance of a contractual obligation shows that the division
between contract and tort is not as sharp as might be imagined. Already before
Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates, Atiyah argued that this division was ‘not soundly
based, either in logic or in history’,143 while Gilmore observed that ‘the two fields,
which had been artificially set apart, are gradually merging and becoming one’.144
Gilmore coined the term ‘contort’ to describe this phenomenon. He predicted that
the law of contract would eventually ‘be swallowed up by tort’, or that both areas of
law would be unified in a ‘generalized theory of civil obligation’.145
138 Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd (No. 1) [1995] 2 AC 145 (HL), p 186.
139 One case is discussed in particular: Midland Bank Trust Co Ltd v. Hett Stubbs & Kemp [1979] Ch
384 (HC).
140 The contribution written by T. WEIR, in Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, pp 3–39, is quoted
often and has clearly influenced the outcome.
141 Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd (No. 1) [1995] 2 AC 145 (HL), pp 193–194.
142 Ibid., pp 193–194.
143 P. ATIYAH, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, p 505.
144 G. GILMORE, The Death of Contract (Columbus: Ohio State University Press 1974), p 88.
145 Ibid., pp 88, 90 and 94.
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50. Up until the present date, English law is not structured on the basis of such a
general theory of obligations.146 The law of contract has not been ‘swallowed up’ by
the law of tort either. Since Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates, it has been debated
whether, and to what extent, the tortious remedy should be influenced, limited or
excluded by the contract. Should the contractual remoteness test, for instance, also
be applied to a concurrent claim in negligence for pure economic loss?147 In a
unanimous judgment, the Court of Appeal recently decided that the test for
recoverability of damage for pure economic loss should indeed be the more restric-
tive ‘reasonable contemplation’ test in contract and not the ‘reasonable foresee-
ability’ test in tort.148 Case law also shows that the level of the contractual duty is
relevant in determining whether there was an assumption of responsibility.149 The
contractual context may thus influence the existence and content of the tort claim,
as is the case in Germany and the Netherlands.
7. Concluding Remarks
51. The overlap between the laws of contract and tort presents challenges to any
system of private law. Yet their solutions differ. French law excludes the possibility
to claim in tort if the damage is caused by or related to the (non-) performance of a
contractual obligation. German, Dutch and English law take the opposite point of
view: finding liability in tort is not precluded if the damage is caused by or related
to the (non-) performance of a contractual obligation.
52. In theory, several arguments have been given for and against both solutions.
Proponents of a fundamental precedence of the law of contract over the law of
tort assert that this solution respects the freedom of contract and the intention of
the legislature. Parties to a contract should not be able to ‘escape’ from the
regime designed for those relationships into the general regime of tort. By
contrast, their adversaries argue that the law of tort should offer a certain level
of protection to all persons, whether they have concluded a contract or not. The
basic principle should therefore be the opposite: in the absence of a clear
intention, on the part of the legislature or the parties themselves, the mere
existence of a contract should not a priori set aside the protection provided by
the law of tort.
146 Although some writers have developed such a theory, e.g. A. Burrows (ed.), English Private Law
(Oxford: OUP, 3rd edn 2013).
147 As proposed by A. BURROWS, in Torts in Commercial Law, pp 367–390. Cf. J. CARTWRIGHT, 55. The
Cambridge Law Journal 1996, pp 488–514.
148 Wellesley Partners LLP v. Withers LLP [2015] EWCACiv 1146.
149 Riyad Bank v. Ahli United Bank (UK) Plc [2006] EWCA Civ 780 (CA); Robinson v. PE Jones
(Contractors) Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 9.
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53. In practice, the choice between these competing solutions is also influenced
by the scope and structure of the laws of contract and tort. French courts have not
merely drawn a distinct line between the two regimes out of a genuine concern for
the freedom of contract and the will of the legislature but also to protect contract-
ing parties against the general strict liability for things. German, Dutch and English
courts have not merely allowed concurrent claims in tort because that solution
suited the structure of their systems of private law but also to protect contracting
parties when it would not be justified to treat them less favourably than passers-by
would be treated.
54. This contribution has shown that the resoluteness of both approaches has
softened over time, as a result of judicial and legislative interventions. Under
German, Dutch and English law, the contractual relationship continues to be
relevant to the assessment of the tort claim. It cannot be said that these legal
systems do not respect the will of the parties and the intention of the legislature. At
the same time, French law has provided additional protection to some contracting
parties, not only by introducing exceptions to the principle of non-cumul but also
by imposing obligations de sécurité.
55. Finally, the contribution has shown that a trend towards convergence can be
observed in all jurisdictions. Germany and the Netherlands have harmonized the
rules on the scope of damages and the prescription of claims. Although codification
of the non-cumul principle is likely, the French legislature has introduced several
general liability regimes and intends to harmonize the rules on damages and
causation in the near future. The dust is settling in English law too, as the courts
are called upon to indicate which test applies to a concurrent claim in tort. As a
consequence, the scope of the problem has been further reduced. However, the
issue itself will not lose its significance as long as differences between the laws of
contract and tort continue to exist.
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